

Nominal Logic

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13 November 2006*

Thanks to Mark Price and Alessio Gugliemi

Nominal logic

Nominal logic is an extension of first-order logic for reasoning with names.

Formulae of first-order logic

Formulae are inductively defined by:

$$\phi ::= \perp \mid \phi \Rightarrow \phi \mid \forall x.\phi \mid t = t.$$

We use standard **classical logic sugar**:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \neg\phi \text{ is } \phi \Rightarrow \perp & \top \text{ is } \neg\perp \\ \phi \wedge \psi \text{ is } \neg(\phi \Rightarrow \neg\psi) & \phi \vee \psi \text{ is } \neg\phi \Rightarrow \psi \\ \phi \Leftrightarrow \psi \text{ is } (\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \wedge (\psi \Rightarrow \phi) & \exists x.\phi \text{ is } \neg\forall x.\neg\phi \end{array}$$

Derivation rules of first-order logic

$$\frac{}{\phi, \Phi \vdash \Psi, \phi} (\mathbf{Ax})$$

$$\frac{}{\perp, \Phi \vdash \Psi} (\perp\mathbf{L})$$

$$\frac{\Phi \vdash \Psi, \phi \quad \psi, \Phi \vdash \Psi}{\phi \Rightarrow \psi, \Phi \vdash \Psi} (\Rightarrow\mathbf{L})$$

$$\frac{\phi, \Phi \vdash \Psi, \psi}{\Phi \vdash \Psi, \phi \Rightarrow \psi} (\Rightarrow\mathbf{R})$$

$$\frac{\phi[x \mapsto t], \Phi \vdash \Psi}{\forall x.\phi, \Phi \vdash \Psi} (\forall\mathbf{L})$$

$$\frac{\Phi \vdash \Psi, \phi}{\Phi \vdash \Psi, \forall x.\phi} (\forall\mathbf{R}) \quad (a \text{ fresh})$$

$$\frac{\phi[x \mapsto t'], \Phi \vdash \Psi}{t' = t, \phi[x \mapsto t], \Phi \vdash \Psi} (= \mathbf{L})$$

$$\frac{}{\Phi \vdash \Psi, t = t} (= \mathbf{R})$$

Data

A slogan:

Names are data.

Compare with another slogan: **Numbers are data.**

Data is represented by terms, e.g. to represent numbers assume term-formers **0** and **succ**. We may also wish to associate some axioms to this data.

For example:

$$\begin{aligned} &\forall x.\forall y.(\text{succ}(x) = \text{succ}(y) \Rightarrow x = y) \quad 0 \neq \text{succ}(x) \\ &\phi[x \mapsto 0] \Rightarrow \forall x.(\phi \Rightarrow \phi[x \mapsto \text{succ}(x)]) \Rightarrow \forall x.\phi. \end{aligned}$$

(The last ‘axiom’ is actually an axiom-**scheme**.)

What kind of data is a name?

Good question! What kind of data **is** a name?

There are no term-formers: (for us) names are atomic.

Introduce a type \mathbb{A} of **names**. The only terms of type \mathbb{A} are variable symbols. Write variable symbols of type \mathbb{A} as a, b, c, \dots

What are the properties of names?

Names can be interchanged

Property 1: **Equivariance.**

$$\phi(x_1, \dots, x_n) \Leftrightarrow \phi((a\ b)x_1, \dots, (a\ b)x_n).$$

Property 2: **Finite support.**

$$\forall b. \forall a. (a\ b)x = x.$$

We silently universally quantify free variables in axioms above;
 $\phi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ denotes a predicate with free variables at most
 $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$.

That's it! Thank you very much for your attention.

It was lovely talking to you. Shall we go to coffee now?

Names can be interchanged

What's that?

You want to know what $(a\ b)x$ and \mathcal{N} are?

Did I forget to mention?

The principle of Equivariance

Actually, names **do** have term-formers. **Swapping** $(a\ b)t$ swaps a and b in t .

E.g. if t is the text **abracadabra** of a program and names are ASCII a, b, \dots , then:

$$(a\ b)\text{abracadabra} = \text{barbcdbbarb}.$$

Equivariance states that truth is invariant (symmetric) up to swapping names:

$$\phi(x_1, \dots, x_n) \Leftrightarrow \phi((a\ b)x_1, \dots, (a\ b)x_n).$$

Examples

Only one, really:

$$a = b \Leftrightarrow b = a \quad a = c \Leftrightarrow b = c \quad c = a \Leftrightarrow c = b$$

All other predicates are built up from this using \Rightarrow , \perp , and \forall .

Suppose f is a term-former. Then

$$f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = z \Leftrightarrow f((a\ b)x_1, \dots, (a\ b)x_n) = (a\ b)z$$

therefore we have equivariance for terms:

Lemma: For any term-former f in the language of terms,

$$(a\ b)f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = f((a\ b)x_1, \dots, (a\ b)x_n).$$

The NEW quantifier \mathbb{V}

The intuitive meaning of $\mathbb{V}a.\phi$ is:

$$\exists S \text{ a finite set of atoms. } \forall b \notin S. \phi[a \mapsto b] \Leftrightarrow \phi.$$

So $\mathbb{V}a.\phi$ means ' ϕ holds for all but finitely many a ' or ' ϕ holds **mostly**'.

Finite support

So $\forall b. \forall a. (b\ a)x = x$ means ‘for most a and most b , $(a\ b)x = x$ ’.

For example if $x = \text{abracadabra}$ then:

- **Most** atoms a are not in $\{a, b, r, c, d\}$.
- **Most** atoms b are not in $\{a, b, r, c, d\}$.

Therefore

$$\forall b. \forall a. ((b\ a)\text{abracadabra} = \text{abracadabra}).$$

Finite support

Suppose that $x = \{a, c, e, g, i, k, m, o, q, s, u, w, y, \dots\}$ (x mentions ‘every other atom’).

Then $\forall b. \forall a. (b \ a)x = x$ does **not** hold. So the set of ‘every other atom’ is **not** permitted.

However the set $y = \{a, b\}$ is permitted, because if you swap two atoms not in y then you get y , and **most** atoms are not in y .

Also $z = \{c, d, e, f, \dots\}$ is permitted, because if you swap two atoms in z then you get z , and **most** atoms are in z .

Freshness

Write $a\#x$ when $\forall b.(b\ a)x = x$. Read this as ‘ a is fresh for x ’. Write $\text{supp}(x) = \{a \mid \neg(a\#x)\}$.

So $\forall b.\forall a.(b\ a)x = x$ means $\forall a.a\#x$ means $\text{supp}(x)$ is finite.

Lemma: If $a\#x$ and $b\#x$ then $(b\ a)x = x$.

Proof: $(c\ a)x = x$ for most c . $(c\ b)x = x$ for most c . Choose some common c such that $(c\ a)x = x$ and $(c\ b)x = x$. Then

$$(a\ b)x = (a\ b)(c\ a)(c\ a)x = (c\ a)(c\ b)(c\ a)x = x.$$

A corollary

Theorem: $\forall a.\phi \Leftrightarrow \neg\forall a.\neg\phi$.

Proof: Suppose $\forall a.\phi$. Then clearly $\neg\forall a.\neg\phi$.

Suppose $\neg\forall a.\neg\phi$; it is **not** the case that **most** **a** satisfy $\phi[a \mapsto \mathbf{a}]$.

(Abuse of notation: **a** is not in the language of terms.)

So for any finite set of atoms there is **some** **a** not in that set such that $\phi[a \mapsto \mathbf{a}]$.

As finite set take $\text{supp}(x_1) \cup \dots \cup \text{supp}(x_n)$. Here the x_1, \dots, x_n are the free variables of ϕ other than a .

So $\phi[a \mapsto \mathbf{a}]$.

A corollary

By equivariance for any \mathbf{b}

$$\phi[a \mapsto \mathbf{a}] \Leftrightarrow (\mathbf{b} \ \mathbf{a})(\phi[a \mapsto \mathbf{a}]).$$

Now $(\mathbf{b} \ \mathbf{a})\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{b}$. By our lemma if $\mathbf{b} \notin \text{supp}(x_1) \cup \dots \cup \text{supp}(x_n)$ then

$$\phi[a \mapsto \mathbf{a}] \Leftrightarrow \phi[a \mapsto \mathbf{b}].$$

But **most** \mathbf{b} are not in $\text{supp}(x_1) \cup \dots \cup \text{supp}(x_n)$. So

$$\forall a. \phi.$$

Properties of \forall

We conclude $\forall a.\phi \Leftrightarrow \neg\forall a.\neg\phi$. \forall is **self-dual**.

Properties of \forall are:

$$\forall a.(\phi \wedge \psi) \Leftrightarrow (\forall a.\phi \wedge \forall a.\psi)$$

$$\forall a.(\phi \vee \psi) \Leftrightarrow (\forall a.\phi \vee \forall a.\psi)$$

$$\forall a.(\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \Leftrightarrow (\forall a.\phi \Rightarrow \forall a.\psi)$$

What do you want next?

Discussion of abstract syntax with binding in Nominal Logic?

Discussion of sequent rules for \mathcal{N} ?

Discussion of possible extensions?